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Abstract
We consider the polling problem in a social network: participants express support for a given option and expect an outcome
reﬂecting the opinion of the majority. Individuals in a social network care about their reputation: they do not want their vote to be
disclosed or any potential misbehavior to be publicly exposed. We exploit this social aspect of users to model dishonest behavior,
and show that a simple secret sharing scheme, combined with lightweight veriﬁcation procedures, enables private and accurate
polling without requiring any central authority or cryptography.
We present DPol, a simple and scalable distributed polling protocol in which misbehaving nodes are exposed with positive
probability and in which the probability of honest participants having their privacy violated is traded off with the impact of dishonest
participants on the accuracy of the polling result. The trade-off is captured by a generic parameter of the protocol, an integer k called
the privacy parameter. In a system of N nodes with B dishonest participants, the probability of disclosing a participant’s vote is
bounded by (B/N)k+1, whereas the impact on the score of each polling option is at most (3k+ 2)B with high probability when
dishonest users are a minority (i.e., B < N/2), assuming nodes are uniformly spread across groups used by the system. When
dishonest users are few (i.e., B <
√
N), the impact bound holds deterministically and our protocol is asymptotically accurate: there
is negligible difference between the true result score of the poll and the outcome of our protocol.
To demonstrate the practicality of DPol, we report on its deployment on 400 PlanetLab nodes. The relative error of the polling
result is less than 10% when faced with the message loss, crashes and delays inherent in PlanetLab. Our experiments show that the
impact on the score of each polling option by dishonest nodes is (2k+1)B on average, consistently lower that the theoretical bound
of (3k+2)B.
Keywords: Distributed polling; Social networks; Overlay networks; Fault tolerance; Security.
1. Introduction
The past few years have seen explosive interest in on-line so-
cial networks and the number of users of such networks is still
growing regularly by the day, with Facebook alone currently
boasting more than 750 million active users. Many of these
users regularly share images and videos as well as discuss vari-
ous social and political matters. They do so with close friends,
but also with people they hardly know.
A particularly useful task in social networks is polling, and
often people would want their responses to be private. For in-
stance, Facebook recently conducted a system-wide poll about
their terms of service [25]. Or as a hypothetical example, the
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organizers of a Saturday night party may also want to ask guests
whether partners should be invited too. In general, a poll seeks
to determine which of d ≥ 2 options is preferred by the greatest
number of participants, typically by allowing each participant
to submit a single vote to indicate her preference. To be mean-
ingful, a polling protocol should tolerate dishonest participants
trying to bias the outcome or discover other participants’ votes.
One can consider different approaches to conduct a polling
in a social network.
Centralized. A straightforward solution for polling is to use
a central server (e.g., Facebook Poll [19] and Doodle [9]). Each
participant sends its vote to a central entity, which subsequently
aggregates all votes and computes the outcome. Besides not be-
ing scalable, this solution does not ensure privacy because par-
ticipants might generally not want their vote (and maybe even
the subject of the poll and the result) to be known by a central
entity, be it trusted or not [33].
Distributed Aggregation. Performing the polling through a
distributed aggregation is a simple, yet naïve, alternative to
avoid a central server. Participants aggregate votes in such a
way that it is impossible to know the vote of a speciﬁc par-
ticipant. Such an aggregation scheme, however, is vulnerable
to attacks. First, participants may signiﬁcantly bias the result
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by corrupting intermediate results. Second, even with aggre-
gation, the initial votes needed for bootstrapping are revealed.
To prevent the initial bootstrapping votes to be known, each
vote could be split according to a homomorphic secret sharing
scheme. However, a dishonest participant can still create an in-
valid initial set of shares, for instance by voting for an arbitrary
large value, and thus bias the result.
Secure Multi-Party Computation. Assuming a minority of
dishonest users, the distributed polling problem may be solved
with complete privacy and no bias on the outcome by using
heavy machinery from cryptography using protocols for secure
multi-party computation (MPC) between N mutually distrust-
ful users [24]. Following two decades of theoretical advances,
MPC protocols to address efﬁciency and scalability concerns
have only recently been proposed [6, 5]. The line of work is
promising, but even the time and communication complexity
of the state-of-the-art protocol (a polynomial in N) [5] are too
large to be practical.
Our solution to the polling problem does not rely on cryp-
tography for ensuring privacy or accuracy. This is for three
reasons. First, we are concerned that the practicality and scal-
ability of the protocol will be impacted by the complexity of
cryptographic techniques. Accordingly, we wish to explore
the space of protocols where we give up some bounded degree
of privacy and accuracy without compromising scalability and
performance. Second, there is a small risk that the unproven
assumptions underlying modern cryptography techniques (e.g.,
impracticality of factoring large numbers or inverting higher
mathematical functions) may be broken. To avoid a full de-
pendence on such techniques, it is prudent to study alterna-
tives. Third, as advocated in [20] and [26], there is scientiﬁc
value in determining if traditional problems in distributed com-
puting (e.g., computation in general and polling in particular)
can be solved without cryptography and if so, how efﬁciently.
These investigations help us understand the crux of the individ-
ual problems.
Instead of using cryptography, we exploit the social nature
of the participants involved in the polling protocol, speciﬁcally
the one-to-one correspondence between social network identi-
ties and real ones. The key insight is that participants in social
networks care about their reputation: information related to a
user ultimately reﬂects on the associated real person. There-
fore, their misbehavior is rather restricted and not fully Byzan-
tine. We leverage this concern and propose an approach which
dissuades dishonest behaviors instead of masking their impact
(e.g., as in BFT [4]) or preventing them (e.g., by using cryptog-
raphy [1]). In addition to running a polling algorithm based on a
simple secret sharing scheme, we execute a distributed veriﬁca-
tion protocol which tags the proﬁles of the participants based on
collected testimonies. A reputation system like EigenTrust [18]
can be used to manage the blames in a robust manner. Social
relationships between users further help preventing colluding
users from submitting wrongful reports.
To illustrate the idea behind tagging, consider a situation
where the testimonies of Alice and Bob demonstrate that Mal-
lory misbehaved. In this situation, Alice’s and Bob’s proﬁles
are then tagged with “Alice and Bob jointly accused Mallory”
and the proﬁle of Mallory is tagged with “Mallory has been ac-
cused by Alice and Bob”. In a social network, no participant
would like to be tagged as dishonest by a protocol that does not
wrongly accuse participants, as we will describe below. Our
protocol does not wrongfully blame participants, but dishonest
participants may [36].
Assuming a system with a large majority of honest partic-
ipants, the risk for a participant to be caught when wrongly
accusing others is high. For instance, if a participant is ac-
cused only by users that are related in the social network (i.e.,
friends forming a coalition), the allegation would be suspicious
and thus not taken into account and the claim would eventually
backﬁre on the accuser. It is important to note that Sybil iden-
tities can be detected by analyzing the speciﬁc characteristics
of social graph (e.g., SybilGuard [39], SybilLimit [38]). With-
out Sybil identities, the problem of dishonesty boils down to
the case where a coalition of real users try to affect an honest
user’s proﬁle by wrongfully blaming her, attempt to spam the
system with a large number of blames, or blame one another
as a smokescreen. By leveraging the acquaintanceship between
users (e.g., the social graph – be it explicit or inferred), several
practical systems have been proposed and successfully applied
to on-line massively multi-player games [12, 17], spam miti-
gation [22, 32] and recommendation systems [35, 8]. Most of
these techniques require a consensus of an unafﬁliated jury to
expel a user and renounce blames originating from friends that
are considered suspicious.
In devising our protocol, we have considered a system with
both honest and dishonest participants. The honest ones follow
the protocol assigned to them whereas the dishonest ones might
not, in order to promote their opinion beyond what is allowed.
Should dishonest nodes deviate from the protocol, we assume
that they never do anything that will jeopardize their reputa-
tion with certainty (i.e., with probability 1). We believe that
our model for dishonest users is more reﬂective of real human
behavior than e.g. Byzantine users as it accounts for social as-
pects of the participants, and is interesting in its own right. It is
an intriguing direction to consider how to solve problems under
this model.
Contributions
We present DPol, a scalable polling protocol that leverages
special properties of social networks. In a nutshell, DPol works
as follows. Participants, clustered in fully connected groups
known as ofﬁces, make use of a simple secret sharing scheme
to encode their vote. Then they send the shares of their vote
to proxies that belong to another group (an ofﬁce). In the con-
text of polling, the shares of a vote are referred to as ballots.
The key idea is that participants can retain privacy by submit-
ting ballots for their chosen candidate as well as ballots for the
candidates they didn’t vote for, making sure to send one more
ballot for the true choice than the other ones. Each ofﬁce com-
putes a partial tally that is further broadcast to all other groups.
Each participant eventually outputs the same tally. DPol is fully
decentralized and does not assign speciﬁc roles to any partici-
pant. Our scheme results in a simple and scalable protocol that
is easy to deploy.
2
Complexity. The time complexity of DPol is O(
√
Nk), the
spatial complexity isO(
√
Nk) and the number of messages sent
is O(
√
Nk), where k is the privacy parameter and N the num-
ber of participants. We point out that other decentralized pro-
tocols have explored the O(
√
N) trade-off between time and
message complexity (e.g., Kelips [14] and [11]).
Privacy and accuracy. The trade-off between privacy and
accuracy arises naturally in our settings: improving accuracy
means verifying the participant’s actions, which in turn com-
promises privacy. We bound the impact on the polling result
by dishonest participants and balance this with the level of pri-
vacy ensured. More speciﬁcally, in a system of N participants
with B colluding dishonest participants (assuming a social net-
work with a limited number of Sybil identities), we can choose
any integer k such that the probability for a given participant
to have its vote recovered by dishonest participants is bounded
by (B/N)k+1 and their impact on the outcome of each of the
d options is bounded by (3k+ 2)B with high probability when
B < N/2 for large N, assuming that dishonest nodes have no
control over the assignment of nodes to groups (more speciﬁ-
cally that nodes are assigned to groups uniformly at random).
For B<
√
N, the accuracy guarantee of (3k+2)B always holds
for any value of N and for any assignment of nodes to groups,
and the relative error on the poll outcome is negligible when N
is large. This is due to the ability of our underlying simple se-
cret sharing scheme to expose, with certainty, dishonest partici-
pants that affect the outcome by more than 3k+2 with only pub-
lic veriﬁcations, i.e., without requiring the participants’ votes
to be revealed. We also show that private veriﬁcations expose,
with positive probability, dishonest participants who try to af-
fect the outcome below the limit (i.e., even if their impact on
each option is less than 3k+ 2), but require inspection of the
contents of a subset of ballots. Our results also imply that a
coalition of a minority of the nodes cannot inﬂuence the out-
come of a poll if the most popular option has a lead of more
than (6k+4)B votes over the runner up.
For illustration, consider a poll with two options, Yes and No
(a binary poll), in a system of 10,000 participants. Further, as-
sume there are 99 colluding dishonest participants (√N−1),
and assume that a fraction α of the participants vote Yes. By
setting k = 1, for instance, we ensure privacy with probabil-
ity 99.99% and when α > 0.54, every participant computes the
right decision (i.e., Yes). While e-voting requires stronger guar-
antees, this amply ﬁts polling applications requirements.
Practicality. DPol is easy to deploy and we report on its de-
ployment on 400 PlanetLab nodes. The result of a binary poll
suffers an average relative error of less than 10% in the face of
message losses, crashes and asynchrony inherent in PlanetLab.
In the presence of dishonest participants, our experiments show
that the impact on the polling result is (4k+ 1)B on average,
consistently lower that the theoretical bound of (6k+4)B. Fur-
ther, we back up various theoretical results with experimental
evaluation throughout the paper.
Roadmap
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model and introduces the terms and notation used
throughout the paper. We present DPol in Section 3 and we re-
port on the deployment of its binary version on PlanetLab. We
analyze the correctness and complexity of the protocol. We de-
rive upper and lower bounds on the impact of dishonest nodes
in Section 4 by considering worst case scenarios. Section 5 re-
visits these bounds in practical scenarios. Probabilistic results
are illustrated with simulations and experiments on PlanetLab.
Section 6 reviews related work and we conclude in Section 7.
2. System Model
We consider a system of N uniquely identiﬁed nodes that rep-
resent participants of a social network. Each node p votes for a
value vp ∈ V and the expected output of the polling algorithm
is a vector containing the proportions of nodes voting for each
value in V . The set of possible votes V is {1, . . . ,d} where d is
the number of options. Each participant in the social network
has an assigned proﬁle which may be tagged by DPol.
We assume that nodes are able to communicate by message-
passing, speciﬁcally that they can receive messages from any
other node in the system. To make this assumption work
in the real world, the communication takes place using UDP
and efﬁcient NAT traversal techniques (“hole punching”) such
as STUN [29]. Other complementary techniques, for in-
stance the Internet Gateway Device Protocol (through Universal
Plug’n’Play), are supported by modern routers and can be used
to let devices behind the NAT to dynamically add translation
rules thus allowing them to receive incoming messages. We
used UDP communication in our implementation and deploy-
ment on PlanetLab.
In our model, nodes are either honest or dishonest. Honest
nodes strictly follow the protocol and contribute to the veri-
ﬁcations as long as their privacy is not compromised. More
speciﬁcally, honest nodes always collaborate with veriﬁcation
procedures that do not require them to reveal their ballots (i.e.,
public veriﬁcations). However, they may refuse to reveal their
ballots for a veriﬁcation procedure (i.e., private veriﬁcation).
Dishonest nodes may misbehave either to promote their opin-
ion or reveal the opinion of honest nodes. They are, however,
rational in the sense that they never behave in such a way that
their reputation is tarnished with certainty, i.e., they do not per-
form attacks that are guaranteed to be detected by public veriﬁ-
cation procedures. As such they are less powerful than Byzan-
tine users. As motivated in the introduction, dishonest nodes do
not wrongfully blame honest nodes since it is rather easy for a
human reader or an automatic tool aware of social relationship
between users, to distinguish between legitimate and wrongful
accusations. Consider, for example, a single participant who
blames a large number of nodes and the case where a group of
related participants all blame an identical set of nodes. Several
existing systems manage to ﬁlter wrongful blames or at least
limit their impact. For instance Digg [8] does not allow related
users to rate each other’s articles. SumUp [35] allows nodes
to vote only over the edges of the social network thus limiting
the impact of coalitions of connected users. Ostra [22] bounds
the emission rate of a node by the number of trust relationships
it has. SocialFilter [32] complements trustworthiness by the
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notion of credibility which weights the reports nodes send. Fi-
nally, EigenTrust [18] uses an iterative algorithm inspired by
PageRank to determine node reputation in a robust way.
We consider participants who collude to form a single coali-
tionB (|B|= B). When dishonest nodes collaborate to bias the
outcome of the poll, they are assumed to share the same opin-
ion. While honest nodes vote for one option, dishonest nodes
may want to promote a set of options. Still, they act selﬁshly in
the sense that they prefer to protect their own reputation to cov-
ering up their suspected accomplices. A single coalition repre-
sents the worst case scenario for both discovering a node’s vote
and for biasing the result of the polling.
DPol relies on a structured overlay, independent of the so-
cial graph, which provides scalable dissemination and facili-
tates veriﬁcations. This overlay could be provided by the so-
cial network infrastructure or be built in a decentralized fash-
ion. The N nodes are clustered into r ordered groups, from g0
to gr−1. A node p in group gi maintains two sets of nodes: a set
Po of ofﬁcemates containing all nodes belonging to the same
group (Po = gi\{p}) and a ﬁxed-size set Pp of proxies, con-
taining nodes in the next group (Pp ⊆ gi+1 mod r). Therefore,
all groups virtually form a ring with g0 being the successor of
gr−1. Each group gi is a clique. We deﬁne the client of a node p
to be a node for which p acts as a proxy. Every node maintains
a list of its clients in the previous group (Pc ⊆ gi−1). Each
node discards messages that originates in nodes which are not
in the set Pc∪Po. Figure 1 depicts the overlay used by DPol.
Several prominent overlay construction protocols make use of
group-based overlays using gossip, the most commonly known
of which is Kelips [14]. These protocols can further be made
robust to dishonest nodes and provide mechanisms that we will
extend for polling. Fireﬂies [16], for instance, builds a random-
ized intrusion-tolerant overlay on which Byzantine nodes have
only a limited control, and is resilient to the eclipse attack (i.e.,
no node has only Byzantine neighbors [36]). Brahms [3] pro-
vides unbiased uniform random peer-sampling in the presence
of Byzantine nodes. Finally, AVMON [23] builds a pseudo-
random overlay based on the hashes of the nodes’ IP addresses
(on which malicious nodes have very little, if any, control) thus
reducing the chances of colluding nodes being connected. We
further discuss the overlay construction and how to make it re-
silient to dishonest nodes in our probabilistic analysis which
assumes a uniform random distribution of nodes among groups
(Section 5).
3. The Polling Protocol
In this section, we present DPol and prove that the protocol
is correct; we then analyze its spatial and message complexity
and present experimental results of a binary poll on PlanetLab.
We complement these experiments with an analysis of DPol in
the presence of crashes and message losses.
3.1. Polling in a nutshell
DPol is composed of three phases: (i) voting, (ii) count-
ing and (iii) broadcasting. A node’s vote goes to one option
p’s clients (Pc)
p’s proxies (Pp)
p’s oﬃcemates (Po)
p
gi
gi+1
group
gi−1
Figure 1: The structure of DPol. Node p in gi acts as a proxy for its clients in
the preceding group gi−1, and has proxies of its own in the successive group
gi+1. It also communicates with its ofﬁcemates – the nodes in gi.
vp ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. During the voting phase, a node generates a set
of ballots in the form of binary vectors of size d,b ∈ {0,1}d re-
ﬂecting its vote (when aggregated) and sends each ballot to one
of its proxies. A ballot with only the ﬁrst two bits set equally
promotes the ﬁrst two options over the d− 2 other options. In
the counting phase, each node in a group computes the sum of
the votes of the nodes in the previous group (local tally). This
is achieved by having each proxy summing up the ballots it
has received and broadcasting the result to its ofﬁcemates. Fi-
nally, the local tallies are forwarded along the ring so that all
nodes eventually compute the ﬁnal outcome. Tallies are natural
numbers vectors of size d,t ∈ Nd and the component with the
maximum value in the ﬁnal tally vector determines the winner
of the poll.
3.2. Description
We now give the algorithm details of each phase of the DPol
protocol.
Voting. The ballot generation method is inspired by the sim-
ple secret sharing scheme introduced in [7] and shares simi-
larities with the Vote/Anti-Vote/Vote system [27]. To vote for
a given value v ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, a node generates 2k+ 1 ballots
b1, . . . ,b2k+1 ∈ {0,1}d representing its vote, where k is an in-
teger called the privacy parameter. To be valid, a ballot must
contain at least one 1 and at least one 0.
In the binary case, a valid ballot is (1,0) or (0,1). In this
case, the intuition is to create k+1 ballots towards a given target
(ﬁrst or second option) and k ballots for the other option, such
that when the ballots are summed they result in a vote for the
chosen option vp. In general, we assign the i-th option with a
vector ci = (0, . . . ,0,1,0 . . . ,0) with 1 in the i-th position and
its complementary vector ci = (1, . . . ,1,0,1, . . . ,1) with a 0 at
the i-th position. In the case where a node is allowed to vote for
a single option, a valid vote therefore equals ci + k · (1, . . . ,1)
where k is the privacy parameter. The ballots emitted by a node
must sum to a valid vote. For instance, in the case d = 3 and
k = 1 the set of ballots {(1,0,0),(0,1,1),(1,0,0)} is valid and
promotes the ﬁrst option.
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Algorithm 1 DPol at node p in group gi, i ∈ {0, . . . ,r−1}
Input: a vote v ∈ {1, . . . ,d}
Variables: an individual tally t′′ = 0
a local tally t′ = 0
an array of local tally sets S [{0, . . . ,r−1}→∅]
a local tally array T [{0, . . . ,r−1}→⊥]
Output: the global tally tˆ
Polling Algorithm
1: vote(v, Pp)
2: local_count(t′′, Pp)
3: t′ = t′+ t′′
4: local_tally_broadcast(i, t′, Pp)
5: tˆ= ∑iT [i]
Voting phase
procedure vote(v,Pp) is
6: {b1, . . . ,b2k+1}= share(v)
7: for each proxy ∈Pp do
8: send [Ballot, bi] (proxy)
9: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [Ballot, b] 〉 do
10: t′′ = t′′+b
function share(v) returns a set of ballot B is
11: B = {cv}
12: for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} do
13: w = random number in {1, . . . ,d}
14: B =B∪{cw}∪{cw}
15: end for
16: return B
Intermediate Counting phase
procedure local_count(t′′,Po) is
17: for each ofﬁcemate ∈Po do
18: send [IndividualTally, t′′] (ofﬁcemate)
19: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [IndividualTally, t] 〉 do
20: t′ = t′+ t
Local Tally Broadcasting & Forwarding phase
procedure local_tally_broadcast(i, t′′, Pp) is
21: for each proxy ∈Pp do
22: send [LocalTally, i, t′] (proxy)
23: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [LocalTally, igroup, t] 〉 do
24: S [igroup] =S [igroup]∪{t}
25: if (
∣∣S [igroup]∣∣= |Pc|) then
26: T [igroup] = choose(S [igroup])
27: if (igroup  (i+1) mod r) then
28: local_tally_broadcast(igroup,T [igroup])
29: end if
30: end if
function choose(A ) returns local tally is
31: return the most represented local tally in A
In DPol, a node generates k ballots associated to k ran-
dom candidates and their complementary ballots and a single
ballot for the candidate v it wants to promote (lines 11–16
in Algorithm 1). Such a set of ballots is valid and sums to
cv + k · (1, . . . ,1). Once a node has generated its 2k+ 1 bal-
lots, it sends each of them to a different proxy. The number of
proxies is to be chosen accordingly,
∣∣Pp∣∣ = 2k+ 1. Lines 6–
9 in Algorithm 1 detail the voting phase. Figure 2(a) depicts a
node sending its 2k+1 ballots (e.g., {(0,1),(1,0),(1,0)}) to its
assigned proxies. Once every node in the system has received
one ballot from each of its clients, the voting round is over.
Intermediate Counting. A group acts as a voting ofﬁce for the
preceding group on the ring. The ofﬁcemates collect ballots
from their clients (Figure 2(b)) and share intermediate results
(Figure 2(c)). To this end, a proxy sums the ballots it received
into an individual tally t′′ (line 10 in Algorithm 1). Once a node
has received the expected number of ballots from its clients, it
broadcasts the computed individual tally to its ofﬁcemates, as
depicted in Figure 2(b) (lines 17–19 in Algorithm 1). The of-
ﬁcemates aggregate the received data, i.e., they sum each oth-
ers’ individual tallies (line 14 in Algorithm 1) and store the re-
sult summed with their individual tally into a local tally t′ as
shown in Figure 2(c) (line 3 in Algorithm 1).
Local Tally Forwarding. Once the intermediate counting phase
is over, i.e., all the ofﬁcemates have computed a local tally, each
node sends the local tally of its group to its proxies (lines 21–
23 in Algorithm 1). Upon reception of a message containing
a local tally, a proxy adds it to the set S [i] of possible values
for gi (line 18 in Algorithm 1). When a proxy has received the
expected number |Pc| of local tallies for a given group gi, it
decides on a local tally by choosing the most represented value
in S [i] and stores it in T [i]. When a local tally T [i] is as-
signed, it is further forwarded (Figure 2(d)) to the next group
using the proxies (lines 25–30 in Algorithm 1). Local tallies
are then forwarded in the system along the ring. When a node
receives the local tally corresponding to its own group, the tally
is no longer forwarded (lines 27–29). The global tally is com-
puted at each node by simply summing the local tallies of all
groups: tˆ= ∑r−1i=0 T [i] (line 5 of Algorithm 1).
The nodes in group gi assume a special role for the members
of the preceding group gi−1: they collect and count ballots from
gi−1 and initiate the dissemination of the resulting local tally
over the ring. Each group has a special role for the preceding
one, and all nodes execute the exact same protocol.
3.3. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the correctness and complexity of
DPol assuming an ideal setting (i.e., reliable channels and non-
faulty nodes) and only honest nodes. We later revisit these as-
sumptions by measuring the impact of message loss and crashes
both analytically and experimentally in Section 3.4. We will
consider the impact of dishonest nodes on privacy and accuracy
in the worst case in Section 4 and on average in Section 5.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Consider a system of size N where
each node p votes for the vp-th option. The polling algorithm
terminates and each node eventually outputs N · k(1, . . . ,1) +
∑p cvp .
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Figure 2: Key phases of DPol with d = 2. (a) A node in gi−1 generates 3 (k = 1) ballots {(1,0),(1,0),(0,1)} and sends them to its proxies in gi. (b) A node in
gi collects its received ballots {(1,0),(1,0),(1,0)} and sums them to (3,0) (individual tally) and shares the tally with its ofﬁcemates in gi as depicted in (c). (c) A
node receives all expected individual tallies {(3,0),(2,1),(1,2)}, then computes and sends the local tally ((9,3)) to its proxies in the next group gi+1 as depicted in
(d). (d) The proxies in gi+1 forward the local tally to their proxies in gi+2.
Proof. (Accuracy) We ﬁrst prove that the local tally computed
in every group gi reﬂects the vote of all nodes in gi−1. The local
tally computed in a group is the sum of the ballots received
by its members. Each node p in gi−1 sends each of its ballots
b1,p, . . . ,b2k+1,p to distinct proxies in gi. Similarly, each proxy
p′ in gi receives a set of ballots Bp′ from its clients. Since all
nodes are honest by assumption, the set of ballots sent by the
nodes in gi−1 equals the set of ballots received in gi. Therefore,
each member of gi computes the local tally to be:
t′ = ∑
p′∈gi
∑
b∈Bp′
b
= ∑
p∈gi−1
2k+1
∑
j=1
b j,p
= ∑
p∈gi−1
[
k · (1, . . . ,1)+ cvp
]
= |gi−1| · k · (1, . . . ,1)+ ∑
p∈gi−1
cvp
Note that this follows from the homomorphic property of the
simple secret sharing scheme. Since nodes do honestly forward
the local tallies along the ring and the messages are eventually
received, each node ends up with the correct values for the local
tallies of every group, and thus the correct global tally.
(Termination) A node knows the number of messages it is
supposed to receive in each phase. Since every node sends the
required number of messages and every message eventually ar-
rives, each phase completes. Because the algorithm has a ﬁnite
number of phases, it is guaranteed to eventually terminate.
Proposition 1 (Spatial complexity). The size S of the state
maintained at each node in group gi is O(r · k+ |gi|).
Proof. A node maintains the set of proxies (2k+ 1), the set of
its ofﬁcemates (|gi|) and the list of its clients (at most |gi−1|).
Additionally, a node stores a set of 2k+ 1 possible values (a
node has 2k+ 1 clients on average) for each of the r local tal-
lies to perform global counting, that is S = O(k) +O(|gi|) +
O(|gi−1|)+O(r · k) = O(r · k+ |gi|).
Proposition 2 (Message complexity). The average number of
messages M sent by a node in group gi is O(r · k+ |gi|).
Proof. A node sends messages during the voting phase (2k+1
ballots), the intermediate counting phase (|gi|−1 individual tal-
lies), and the global counting phase which involves the dissem-
ination of r local tallies along the ring using its 2k+1 proxies,
that is M = O(k)+O(|gi|)+O(r · k) = O(r · k+ |gi|).
Note that the parameters are not independent: the sizes of the
groups are related and bound to the number of groups by the re-
lation ∑r−1i=0 |gi|=N. The two quantities M and S are minimized
when r =
√
N/k and |gi|=
√
Nk, and thus M = S=O(
√
Nk).
Proposition 3 (Time complexity). Under the assumption of a
synchronous system where time evolves in rounds, DPol oper-
ates in O(max |gi|+ rk) rounds.
Proof. The voting phase operates in 2k+1 rounds. The count-
ing phase requires each node to send its individual tally to its
|gi|− 1 ofﬁcemates. All the nodes in the system send their in-
dividual tally in parallel, therefore the time complexity of this
phase is O(|gi|). The local tally broadcast phase operates in
O(kr) rounds as it requires 2k+ 1 rounds for a local tally to
be forwarded from one group to the next one and the ring is
composed of r groups.
Using the values of the parameters r and {gi}ri=1 speciﬁed
above, the time complexity of DPol is O(
√
Nk).
3.4. Evaluation
We report on the deployment of DPol, in the case of binary
polling, on a PlanetLab testbed of 400 nodes and analyze the
practical performance of DPol. The message loss rates, crashes
and asynchrony inherent to PlanetLab allow us to experiment
with the algorithm in tough real-world settings. We evaluate
our algorithm with two different privacy parameter values k= 1
and k = 2.
6
Overlay. The cluster-ring-based overlay is built using a cen-
tralized bootstrapping entity which keeps track of the whole
set of nodes, assigning each node to a random group. Nodes
have exactly 2k+1 proxies in the next group and the number of
clients of a node is (2k+1) |gi−1|/ |gi| on average.
Communication and Asynchrony. Nodes communicate by
UDP which may suffer message loss on the communication
channels. For instance, we observed loss rates on PlanetLab
ranging from 5% to 15%. In addition, PlanetLab nodes are un-
reliable, causing expected messages to be lost due to sender
crashes. Therefore, phase terminations cannot be detected by
simply counting the number of received messages. In the local
tally forwarding phase, when the number of possible values for
a local tally grows beyond a given threshold γ · |Pc|, the node
gets Δt seconds to make the decision for this particular local
tally. The two other phases are simply bounded in time. In our
implementation, γ is set to 0.5 and Δt to 5 seconds.
Experimental results. Figure 3 shows the accuracy of DPol
among 400 PlanetLab nodes with k = 2. Figure 3(a) considers
the value of the outcome while Figure 3(b) considers the sign of
the outcome. By outcome we mean the difference between the
number of votes for the ﬁrst option (i.e., corresponding to the
ﬁrst component of the tally) and the number of votes for the sec-
ond option. More speciﬁcally, the outcome equals (1,−1)T · t′′.
Without loss of generality, we vary the proportion α of node
voting for the ﬁrst option between 0.5 and 1. In Figure 3(a), we
plot the standard deviation on the computed outcome for α in
that range. For each run, we compute the average of the error
when computing the outcome (this is the difference between the
outcome on each node and the real one) over all nodes. Each
point represents the average of this value over 20 independent
runs. Note that the accuracy increases when α is close to 0.5.
This is because the closer the tally is to 0.5, the lower the impact
of message losses on the outcome. Effectively, the two compo-
nents of the individual and local tallies are close and therefore
their impact on the outcome is close to zero.
Figure 3(b) displays the fraction of nodes deciding on the
winning option (among the nodes that were able to decide on
a global tally) as a function of α . Effectively, even if the stan-
dard deviation is relatively small, some nodes may decide in-
correctly on the winning option. Consider the organizers of
a Saturday night party asking their friends in a social network
whether partners should be excluded or not. As depicted in Fig-
ure 3(b), for α = 52.5%, some nodes would compute a different
answer than the majority. This means that a minority of partic-
ipants who compute negative outcome would come with their
partners. Figure 3(b) (solid line) also shows the proportion of
nodes that are unable to decide on a global tally (because their
set of possible values never reach the threshold γ). We observe
that this fraction remains very low (less than 4%) and is inde-
pendent of α .
Analysis. Crashes and message loss do arise and affect the cor-
rectness and termination of the protocol. Crashes can impact
the system in two different ways. First, nodes may crash in-
dependently before sending unique information. The infor-
mation refers to data they received that did not yet get repli-
cated, typically initial shares of votes (i.e., ballots). Losing
such data affects the global tally. Second, several nodes may
be crashed at given time. This may result in other nodes be-
ing unable to decide on a local tally and thus on the global
tally from a lack of corroborating pieces of information. In the
following, we analyze the impact of the ﬁrst type of crashes
on the outcome. Finally, by relaxing the decision condition
from
∣∣S [igroup]∣∣= |Pc| to ∣∣S [igroup]∣∣≥ γ · |Pc| (as described
above), we compute the probability of a node failing to decide
on the global tally.
Proposition 4 (Impact of crashes on accuracy). An individual
crash can affect the score of an option up to 3k+2.
Proof. Consider a node that crashes before broadcasting its in-
dividual tally to its ofﬁcemates. This individual tally is lost,
and represents the sum of the |Pc| = 2k + 1 ballots sent by
its clients. The impact of such a crash on each option score is
bounded by 2k+ 1 since ballots are binary vectors. Moreover,
if a node crashes while sending its ballots, it affects each option
score by up to k+ 1. The maximum impact of an individual
crash is thus 2k+1+ k+1 = 3k+2.
We assume that nodes crash with probability c and never re-
cover from a crash. There is a probability di for a node p ∈ gi
not to decide on the local tally of group r. This can happen if
more than (1− γ) |Pc|= (1− γ)(2k+1) clients fail to forward
the local tally because they either crashed or have themselves
not decided on the local tally. We deﬁne ei as the probabil-
ity for a node in gi to fail to forward a local tally. We have
ei = c+(1− c)di where
di =
γ(2k+1)−1
∑
j=0
(
2k+1
j
)
(1− ei−1) j e2k+1− ji−1 and d0 = 0
A node does not decide on the global tally if it has not has
decided on at least one local tally, that is dr.
Discussion. DPol is a decentralized peer-to-peer protocol de-
ployed on the Internet, where nodes may leave and join the sys-
tem dynamically. This behavior, referred to as churn, is both
common and widespread, and may further disrupt the func-
tion of the protocol beyond message loss and node crashes.
Fortunately, because our protocol is lightweight and executes
quickly, the impact of churn is at the same manageable level
as we observed in our PlanetLab experiments (i.e., only a few
nodes among the 400 nodes participating in the poll crashed or
left during the course of the protocol) as we detail below.
As we explained at the beginning of this Section, the phases
of DPol are bounded in time for fault-tolerance. During our
experiments with 400 nodes, we set the time-out δ to 5 sec-
onds, thus giving an execution time of less than 20 seconds.
Using Proposition 3, which states that the time complexity of
DPol grows as
√
N, we can make a projection for a poll involv-
ing 100,000 participants (recall that DPol targets polls within
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Figure 3: Accuracy of the algorithm in presence of asynchrony, message loss and failures (N = 400 and k = 2). [400 nodes PlanetLab tested]
groups rather than in the entire social network): the algorithm
is expected to complete in approximately ﬁve minutes.
To put this duration in perspective, several trace-driven anal-
ysis of churn in various peer-to-peer systems and applications,
including ﬁle-sharing (BitTorrent, eDonkey [34]), Voice over
IP (Skype [37]) and on-line social networks (Facebook, Hi-
Five [30]), report an average session time of at least a few min-
utes. They further show that this duration is signiﬁcantly in-
creased when considering peers who already spent some time
in the system, and initial duration of 5 minutes are typical for
social networks. For instance, it is shown in [34] that more than
95% of the peers who already spent an hour in the system stay
at least one more hour in the system. Therefore, by assuming
(or even requiring) that peers have spent a reasonable time on-
line to participate to the poll, the impact of churn is brought
down to a level in which we ensure stability for a correct exe-
cution of the protocol. This corresponds to the outcome of our
experiments, in which only a handful of nodes were unable to
determine the outcome of the poll due to crashes.
4. Impact of dishonest nodes
In this section, we analyze the maximum impact of dishon-
est nodes on DPol. For the sake of the analysis, we assume an
overlay with
√
N groups of size
√
N (
√
N ∈N), such as Kelips
[14], and that each node has exactly the same number (2k+ 1)
of clients and proxies. We consider a polling scheme based on
secret sharing to preserve privacy and we assume auxiliary ver-
iﬁcation schemes to detect attacks and identify dishonest nodes.
We distinguish between two types of veriﬁcations: (i) pub-
lic veriﬁcations that leverage only information which does not
compromise the nodes’ privacy (i.e., the content of the ballots),
such as the individual tallies received from their ofﬁcemates,
and (ii) private veriﬁcations that may leverage all information
including the content of the ballots.
To dissuade nodes from misbehaving, veriﬁcations affect the
user proﬁles of the involved nodes. When an attack is detected
and reported, the neighbors of the accused nodes, i.e., the nodes
it communicates with (typically clients and proxies), are asked
for the messages they exchanged. If the testimonies of p1 and
p2 demonstrate that p0 misbehaved, their proﬁles are tagged
with “p1 and p2 jointly accused p0” and the proﬁle of p0 is
tagged with “p0 has been accused by p1 and p2”. These tags
can then be used to determine abnormal behaviors.
4.1. Preserving privacy in the presence of dishonest nodes
We derive a theoretical upper bound on the impact of a coali-
tion of dishonest nodes on the nodes’ privacy, that is the maxi-
mum number of votes the dishonest coalition can disclose.
Theorem 2. A coalition of B malicious nodes can disclose the
votes of at most B · 2k+1k+1  ≤ 2B honest users.
Proof. This theorem follows from the secret sharing scheme
used in DPol, which is to divide a node’s vote into 2k+ 1 bal-
lots. Among them, k+ 1 ballots have the bit corresponding to
the node’s vote set and only k ballots have the bit correspond-
ing to each competing candidate set. We ﬁrst prove that a node’s
vote is disclosed by dishonest nodes if and only if its k+1 prox-
ies that received the ballots corresponding to its vote (i.e., the
ballots in which the vp-th bit is set) belong to the coalition. It is
clear that if k+1 ballots received by the dishonest have a bit set
at the vp-position, the vote is recovered with certainty. We now
prove the contrapositive statement by contradiction. Let b be
the sum of the ballots sent by p to dishonest proxies. We sup-
pose that all the components ofb are strictly lower than k+ 1
and assume that the dishonest coalition recovers the client’s
vote. Not all of the 2k+1 proxies can be dishonest, otherwise,b
would simply have been the vote of p, that is cvp + k · (1, . . . ,1)
(whose vp-th component is equal to k+1). The best case (from
the standpoint of the coalition) is when 2k proxies are dishon-
est. In that case, the components ofb are either equal to k− 1
or k. The vote of p is recovered with certainty if and only if a
single component ofb is equal to k. This implies that the miss-
ing ballot contains only ones, which is in contradiction with the
deﬁnition of a valid ballot.
Since all nodes, including dishonest ones, have exactly 2k+1
clients, the dishonest coalition collects a total of B · (2k+ 1)
ballots which in turn may recover at most B · 2k+1k+1  votes.
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4.2. Conﬁning the impact of dishonest nodes
First, we assume that honest nodes do not want to disclose
any of the ballots they sent or received (i.e., public veriﬁca-
tions). In this context, we study the impact of colluding dishon-
est nodes.
Next, we assume that honest nodes are willing to sacriﬁce
privacy for accuracy by revealing some of their ballots (i.e., pri-
vate veriﬁcation) and we explore how this information can be
used to catch dishonest nodes that cheat without being detected
by public veriﬁcations.
4.2.1. Impact of a dishonest coalition under public veriﬁca-
tions
To anthropomorphize the discussion, suppose that votes are
being cast for d distinct candidates representing the different
options of the poll. Recall that the global tally is the d-ary vec-
tor ∑p cvp +N · k · (1, . . . ,1), whose components correspond to
the tallies for each candidate in the poll.
Theorem 3. For B <
√
N, every member of a dishonest coali-
tion may affect each candidate score up to 3k+2 without being
detected by public veriﬁcations.
Proof (structure). The proof relies on the facts that (i) honest
nodes always tell the truth and strictly follow the protocol (in-
cluding veriﬁcations), and (ii) dishonest nodes do not behave in
such a way that their reputation is tarnished with certainty. Ef-
fectively, showing that the attacks with an impact greater than
3k+ 2 are detected by the honest nodes with certainty proves
the theorem. A dishonest node may bias the protocol at all three
phases. Lemmas 4-7 encompass all possible attacks, propose a
detection scheme relying on honest nodes, and bound the im-
pact of those that cannot be detected with certainty. In addition,
if an attack is detected, we prove that the dishonest node is ex-
posed by the public veriﬁcation. Summing the impacts of all
these attacks (Lemmas 4 and 5) for each dishonest node gives a
maximum impact of k+1+(2k+1) = 3k+2 on each compo-
nent of the global tally.
Note that the proof relies on the assumption B<
√
N , where
N is the size of the system and the size of a group is
√
N, to
ensure that the dishonest coalition can neither “control” (there
is at least one honest node to report a misbehavior inside each
group) nor “fool” an entire group without being detected (there
are not enough dishonest nodes to both perform and cover dis-
honest actions). This security property holds deterministically
under the assumption B <
√
N irrespective of how dishonest
nodes are distributed among the groups. Indeed, in the worst
case scenario where all dishonest nodes are concentrated in one
or two consecutive groups, the fact that the number of dishonest
nodes is strictly smaller than the size of a group guarantees that
there is at least one honest node in each group and that there is
a majority of honest node in every pair of successive groups.
The weakest assumption needed is that two consecutive
groups contain less than
√
N dishonest nodes, formally that
|gi∩B|+ |gi+1∩B| <
√
N for all i. In Section 5, we provide
probabilistic analysis of this bound in a setting where dishon-
est nodes are distributed randomly among the groups and prove
that the system is not compromised (dishonest nodes do not
form a majority in any pair of consecutive groups) with high
probability when N tends to inﬁnity for B < N/2.
Corollary 1. When the margin of the leading candidate over
the next candidate is more than (6k+ 4)B, a coalition of B <√
N dishonest nodes cannot inﬂuence the outcome of the poll.
Proof. By Theorem 3, colluding dishonest users may decrease
the score of the leading candidate by at most (3k + 2)B and
boost the score of some other candidates by at most (3k+2)B.
This decreases the lead of the top candidate over the runner
up by at most (6k+ 4)B, which is not sufﬁcient to change the
outcome of the poll.
Note that one can infer a relation between the margin by
which the leading candidate wins and the maximum number
of dishonest nodes the system can tolerate (i.e., to output the
correct winner). Consider the binary case for instance where a
proportion α > 0.5 of nodes promote the ﬁrst candidate. Then
the margin is N(2α−1) and the maximum number of dishonest
nodes the system can tolerate is N(2α−1)/(6k+4).
Corollary 2. If the proportions of nodes voting for each can-
didates are nonzero, DPol is asymptotically accurate for B =
o(N) dishonest nodes.
Proof. Let (α1, . . . ,αd) be the proportions of nodes voting for
the respective candidates. It can be inferred from Theorem 3
that the relative error on the score of the i-th candidate is
bounded by (3k+ 2)B/(αiN). Using the fact that B is a sub-
linear function of N proves that the relative error on the vector
of scores computed by DPol tends to 0 when N tends to inﬁnity,
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 4 (Voting). When voting, a dishonest node can affect
each candidate score by at most k+1.
Proof. Due to the overlay structure, a node can only send bal-
lots to the proxies it is assigned (otherwise the ballots are dis-
carded), which is a maximum of 2k+ 1 ballots. Therefore a
dishonest node may affect each component of the global tally
by either (i) sending less ballots than it is supposed to or (ii)
by sending less than k or more than k+ 1 positive ballots for
a given candidate (i.e., the bit corresponding to that candidate
is set in the considered ballot). In the worst case, the dishon-
est node sends either 2k+ 1 or 0 positive ballots for a candi-
date. Since the node should send either k or k+1 positive bal-
lots for that candidate, the maximum impact is |(2k+1)− k|=
|0− (k+1)|= k+1. Note that if the node sends 2k+1 positive
ballots for the candidate it is voting for, or 0 positive ballots for
a candidate that it is not voting for, the impact is k.
Lemma 5 (Computing individual tallies). Assuming B <
√
N,
there exists a public veriﬁcation scheme such that if a dishonest
node modiﬁes the individual tally for a candidate by more than
2k+ 1, then the attack is detected with certainty and the node
is exposed.
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Proof. The overlay structure we consider ensures that any node
has exactly 2k+ 1 clients and thus receives 2k+ 1 ballots dur-
ing the voting phase. A dishonest node can modify the can-
didate score by pretending that it received some other number
of positive ballots for that candidate, thus affecting the candi-
date score in its individual tally. If the dishonest node tries to
forge too many ballots, speciﬁcally by reporting a candidate
score outside the range [0,2k+ 1], then the attack is identiﬁed
by its honest ofﬁcemates (the assumption B <
√
N ensures that
at least one such node exists in each voting ofﬁce). Therefore,
in order to not to be publicly detected with certainty, a node
that corrupts or forges ballots must output an individual tally
in that range. Consequently, the worst case occurs when a dis-
honest node receives 2k+1 positive ballots for a candidate and
discards them all while summing them, leading to a maximum
impact of 2k+1 on that candidate’s score.
We stress that the veriﬁcation schemes described in the proof
succeed to detect misbehavior even in case of collusion. Con-
sider the following situation: a client sends an erroneous ballot
(e.g., with value 2 for the ﬁrst candidate) to a colluding proxy
who will aggregate it with its individual tally without report-
ing the misbehavior. If the dishonest proxy has received only
positive ballots for the ﬁrst candidate (or already turned all the
negative ballots into positive ones), the ﬁrst component in its
individual tally will become 2k+2 which is larger than 2k+1.
This range violation will be detected with certainty. If the dis-
honest proxy received at least one ballot negative for the ﬁrst
candidate, then covering up for its co-conspirator comes down
to turning this negative ballot into a positive one, and the impact
will therefore be bounded by 2k+ 1. Finally, the assumption
that at most
√
N−1 nodes are dishonest ensures that there is at
least one honest node in each group to report individual tallies
outside the range [0,2k+1].
Lemma 6 (Broadcasting individual tallies). There exists a pub-
lic veriﬁcation scheme so that a dishonest node that broadcasts
inconsistent copies of its individual tally to honest nodes, i.e.,
sending different values to its honest ofﬁcemates, is detected
with certainty and the node is exposed.
Proof. Before deciding on a local tally, every node broadcasts
the set of individual tallies it received to its ofﬁcemates. This
way, an honest ofﬁcemate will trivially detect the inconsistency.
Dishonest nodes are exposed when their neighbors are asked for
the individual tallies they received from these nodes.
Note that broadcasting different individual tallies can help a
dishonest node to impose an arbitrary value for the local tally.
For instance, suppose that k = 2 and that some proxy has 2k+
1= 5 clients of which only two are dishonest. In this case, there
is a majority of honest nodes. Consequently, if the honest nodes
send the same local tally, it will be the one chosen by the proxy.
However, if the dishonest nodes send different values as their
individual tallies then honest nodes will compute different local
tallies. The proxy will then decide on the arbitrary local tally
sent by the dishonest nodes because it is the most represented.
Lemma 7 (Forwarding local tallies). There exists a public ver-
iﬁcation scheme to detect with certainty if a group forwards
inconsistent copies of a local tally, i.e., nodes sending different
values to their proxies, and to expose the dishonest nodes.
Proof. Inconsistency in local tally forwarding is detected as-
suming the following: before deciding on a local tally, a node
broadcasts the set of received local tallies to its ofﬁcemates. An
inconsistency is detected if at least one of the following condi-
tions is satisﬁed: (C1) an honest node received different local
tallies from its clients, (C2) an honest node received different
local tallies than its ofﬁcemates. Consider j dishonest nodes
concentrated in a group gi forwarding an incorrect local tally
to their proxies. Because of (C1), the clients of an honest node
in gi+1 must all be dishonest. Since the number of clients of
all nodes equals their number of proxies (2k+ 1), j colluding
dishonest nodes can corrupt a maximum of j proxies. There-
fore, the
√
N − j remaining proxies in gi+1 must collude with
the coalition in gi to circumvent (C2). This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. To conclude, in order not to be detected, such an attack
requires j dishonest nodes in gi and
√
N − j dishonest nodes
in gi+1, that is a minimum number of
√
N dishonest nodes in
gi ∪ gi+1. Assuming B <
√
N, either a dishonest node in gi
is exposed by a public veriﬁcation scheme (since it broadcast
a local tally that does not correspond to the sum of individual
tallies it received) or a dishonest node in gi+1 is exposed by a
public veriﬁcation scheme (since it has broadcast a different lo-
cal tally from the one it received). The proof holds for every
hop of the forwarding, including the initial hop which is con-
ducted by the nodes who actually computed the local tally being
forwarded.
gi gi+1
Figure 4: Corrupted local tally that remains undetected.
4.2.2. Leveraging private veriﬁcations
So far we have only considered public veriﬁcations in which
the contents of the ballots are never disclosed. Now assume that
the nodes accept, with nonzero probability, to relax privacy for
the sake of veriﬁcations and reveal a subset of the ballots they
sent or received or both. This partial information can then be
leveraged to detect the dishonest behaviors described in Lem-
mas 4 and 5.
Consider as a ﬁrst step, for the sake of simplicity, the case
of binary polling. During the voting phase, a dishonest node
10
that sent k+ 1+ j ballots (1,0) and only k− j ballots (0,1)
(1≤ j≤ k) is unable to provide the identiﬁer of k− j+1 proxies
to which it sent a (0,1) ballot. Therefore, a simple veriﬁcation
is to ask the suspected node to provide a list of proxies who can
testify that the node sent at least j′ ballots of each kind, for a
random value j′ ranging from 1 to k. Note that an inspected
node can disclose up to j′ = k ballots without revealing its vote.
For d > 2, the components of an inspected node’s vote may be
veriﬁed independently. Effectively, to check that the vote of
a node for the i-th candidate is in [ j′,2k+ 1− j′] ( j′ ranging
from 1 to k), the veriﬁer asks the inspected node to provide the
address of j′ proxies to which it sent a ballot with a 0 at the i-th
position and k proxies to which it sent a ballot with a bit set in
the i-th position.
During a ballot corruption attack (Lemma 5), partial infor-
mation about the ballots received by the inspected node can be
leveraged to reﬁne the bound on its individual tally: suppose
the inspected node received nb ballots (i.e., under the perfect
client-proxy matching assumption nb = 2k+ 1), if we further
know that it received at least n+b ballots (1,0) and n
−
b ballots
(0,1), then the bound on the score of the ﬁrst candidate can be
reﬁned from [0,nb] to [n+b ,nb −n−b ]. Similarly, the score of the
second candidate in the individual tally must be in the range
[n−b ,nb −n+b ]. This veriﬁcation scheme extends naturally to the
cases where d > 2.
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Figure 5: Dishonest nodes (p1 and p2) do not beneﬁt from covering up for each
other (illustrated in the binary case).
In both of the aforementioned veriﬁcation schemes, dishon-
est nodes have no interest in covering up for one another. Con-
sider the examples depicted in Figure 5 where a dishonest node
p1 is the client of a dishonest node p2. In Figure 5(a), if p1’s
vote is veriﬁed and p2 covers p1 up, i.e., it testiﬁes that p1 sent
a ballot (0,1), then it exposes itself to a private veriﬁcation on
its individual tally. Note that a node’s statement has to be con-
sistent across different veriﬁcations, thus if the vote of p2 is fur-
ther veriﬁed, p2 must stick to its ﬁrst version about the ballots it
received. The same situation occurs in Figure 5(b): if p2’s indi-
vidual tally is veriﬁed and p2 covers up for p1, i.e., it testiﬁes it
sent a ballot (0,1) to p2, it puts itself at risk should it be subject
to a private veriﬁcation on its vote. Since we assume that dis-
honest nodes are selﬁsh, they never cover each other up when
privately veriﬁed. In conclusion, relaxing privacy ensures that
every dishonest node has nonzero probability to be exposed. A
lower bound on this probability is given in Section 5.5.
5. Polling in practice
So far we evaluated the impact of a coalition of dishonest
nodes in a worst case scenario. In this section, we revisit the
results and assumptions of the previous section for the average
case. More speciﬁcally, we assume a random uniform distri-
bution of nodes across the r groups and that nodes in the next
groups are distributed uniformly at random as proxies in the
preceding groups. We justify this assumption by sketching an
overlay construction protocol, inspired by various techniques
found in the literature, which guarantees a uniform pseudo-
random distribution of nodes in groups on which nodes will
have no or very little control (§5.1). We then study the aver-
age impact of dishonest nodes on privacy (§5.2) and accuracy
(§5.3). Then we reﬁne the security condition that prevents dis-
honest nodes from biasing local tallies in an unbounded way
during forwarding (i.e., controlling two consecutive groups as
explained in Lemma 7) (§5.4). Finally, we give a lower bound
on the probability of detecting a dishonest node who cheats
within the bounds (i.e., 3k+ 2) by means of private veriﬁca-
tions as function of the willingness of honest nodes to compro-
mise their privacy (i.e., disclose their vote) (§5.5). The results
presented in this section are consistent with simulations and ex-
periments on a 400-node PlanetLab testbed.
5.1. Overlay construction
The overlay driving DPol organizes the nodes in
√
N groups
arranged on a ring. Each node is connected to all the nodes in
its group (i.e., its ofﬁcemates), as well as exactly 2k+ 1 proxy
nodes in the next group on the ring, and to 2k+1 client nodes in
the previous group on the ring. A node is assigned to the group
hash(IP) mod
√
N. Note that this assignment may be veriﬁed
locally by any node. Nodes can discover the nodes in their own
group (and thus connect to their ofﬁcemates) and in the next
one using a (robust) peer sampling service. By making each
node sort the list of the nodes in its own group and in the next
one by increasing hashes and making the j-th node in group i
choose node number j+ 1, . . . , j+ k in group i+ 1 as proxies,
we obtain the overlay required by DPol, with the desired uni-
formity property, in a scalable and decentralized fashion. The
overlay construction protocol, while being deterministic in its
initial design, can be randomized by concatenating a random
value shared by all nodes to the nodes’ IP addresses when com-
puting the hashes.
5.2. Privacy
We now assess the privacy guarantees provided by DPol
when the dishonest nodes are placed (i.e., the groups they be-
long to and their set of clients and proxies) uniformly at ran-
dom.
Theorem 8 (Privacy). The probability for a given node to
have its vote recovered by a coalition of B dishonest nodes is
bounded by (B/N)k+1.
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Proof. We proved in Theorem 2 that the vote of a node is re-
covered with certainty by the dishonest nodes if and only if
the k+ 1 proxies who received the k+ 1 ballots containing a
vote for the chosen candidate collude. This event occurs with
probability
( B
k+1
)
/
( N
k+1
)
when nodes are randomly distributed
in the overlay. For all k,B and N, this probability is bounded by
(B/N)k+1.
In order to link the average level of privacy guaranteed by
the protocol to the parameter k, the system administrator needs
to estimate the proportion of dishonest nodes. However, it is
important to note that DPol is oblivious of this proportion: be
the proportion of dishonest nodes higher than the estimation,
the level of privacy offered would be lower than expected but
DPol would still function properly.
5.3. Accuracy
We now report on the evaluation of DPol in the binary case
over the PlanetLab testbed. The goal of the evaluation is to
compare DPol against the presented theoretical bounds. Our
experiments focus on binary polling. These experiments show
that, in a practical setting, DPol suffers an average impact of
dishonest nodes of around (4k+2)B on the outcome of the poll
(i.e., the score of the ﬁrst candidate minus the score of the sec-
ond candidate). With a proportion α of nodes voting for the
ﬁrst candidate, the outcome is αN− (1−α)N = N(2α−1).
We consider the worst case: dishonest nodes perform every
possible attack that does not compromise their reputation with
probability 1 to promote the second candidate, i.e., each dis-
honest node (i) sends 2k+1 ballots (0,1), and (ii) inverts every
ballot (1,0) it receives into a ballot (0,1). Figure 6 displays for
k = 1 and k = 2 the resulting tally (sign on the upper part of the
ﬁgure and value on the lower part), compared to the real one
(dashed line), for B = 19 dishonest nodes (B = √N−1) in a
system of N = 400 nodes.
We observe that the dishonest coalition affects the outcome
of the poll within the theoretical bound derived in the analysis
(dotted lines in Figure 6). Since a dishonest node can impact the
score of each candidate by up to 3k+ 2, its maximum impact
on the outcome is 6k+ 4. However, the average impact of the
coalition is less than 6k+ 4 (considering the worst case where
the dishonest proxy receives only ballots (1,0) and inverts them
all). The theoretical bound is never reached as the average im-
pact of a dishonest node depends on the actual number of ballots
it can invert; this, in turn, depends on the proportion α of nodes
voting for the ﬁrst candidate.
Effectively, a voting node sends k + 1 ballots (1,0) out
of 2k + 1 if it votes for the ﬁrst candidate and k otherwise.
Therefore, the number of ballots (1,0) received by a proxy is
(2k+ 1)
[
α k+12k+1 +(1−α) k2k+1
]
= k+α on average. The im-
pact of a dishonest user who turns ballots (1,0) into ballots
(0,1) is 2(k+α) on average. In addition, dishonest nodes im-
pact the outcome by another 2k by sending 2k+1 ballots (0,1)
during the voting phase. Their total impact is therefore around
4k+1.
Considering a system with B such dishonest users, the biased
outcome can be expressed as N(2α−1)−B(4k+2α) = 2(N−
B)(α − 12 )− B(4k + 1). For k = 2, ﬁtting our 55-data point
cloud with a least-squares regression line (plain line in Figure 6)
a(α − 12 ) + b gives a = 791 and b = −163. This is close to
the expected parameter values a = 2(N − B) = 760 and b =
−B(4k+1) =−180. We use this analysis to make a projection
on larger scale systems. For k = 1 (Figure 6(a)), every node of
the poll outputs a valid binary results when α > 0.62, which is
to be compared to α > 0.55 observed in Figure 3(b) (without
dishonest nodes). On average, we can derive analytically that
with N = 10,000 and B = 99, the proportion α for which all
nodes decide correctly is α > 0.52.
5.4. Security
Assuming that dishonest nodes are able to choose their prox-
ies and clients, we have shown in Lemma 7 that they can both
perform and cover dishonest actions as soon as the number of
dishonest nodes in two consecutive groups is greater than
√
N.
In other words, the protocol is secure against this attack when
the condition ∀i, |gi∩B|+ |gi+1∩B|<
√
N holds. If B<
√
N,
this condition holds with certainty, regardless of the distribution
of dishonest nodes among groups. Otherwise, there is a nonzero
probability that the condition is violated.
Theorem 9 (Tolerance to dishonest nodes). The probability
that B dishonest nodes compromise the system (i.e., control two
consecutive groups as deﬁned in Lemma 7) is 1 when B ≥ N2 ,
and converges to 0 exponentially fast in
√
N when B < N2 .
Proof. As deﬁned in Lemma 7, groups i and i+ 1 have been
compromised if |gi∩B|+ |gi+1∩B| ≥
√
N. Since gi and gi+1
are disjoint, this event is equivalent to |Gi ∩B| ≥
√
N where
Gi = gi∪gi+1 for all i.
We ﬁrst show that if B ≥ N2 then dishonest nodes will com-
promise the system regardless of their allocation to groups.
We prove the contrapositive statement, so suppose no groups
are compromised. Then |gi ∩B| <
√
N for all groups i.
Summing the inequalities up for all the
√
N groups, we get
∑i |gi∩B|+ |gi+1∩B| < N, that is, 2∑i |gi∩B| < N, which
implies that 2B < N and ﬁnally B < N/2. Thus if B ≥ N2 , then
some pair of consecutive groups is compromised.
We now consider the case where B < N2 . Let β =
B
N <
1
2 be
the proportion of dishonest nodes in the system. By the stan-
dard Hoeffding bounds for sampling from a ﬁnite population
without replacement, the probability that groups i and i+1 are
compromised is:
pi = P
[
|Gi∩B| ≥
√
N
]
= P
[
|Gi∩B|−2
√
Nβ ≥ 2
√
N
(
1
2
−β
)]
≤ exp
(
−4
√
N
(
1
2
−β
)2)
.
The right-hand function converges to zero exponentially fast in√
N since β < 12 . Using the union bound, the probability that
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Figure 6: Accuracy of the poll in the presence of dishonest nodes: with N = 400 and B = 19, dishonest nodes manage to confuse the majority of the nodes for (a)
α < 0.62 when k = 1, and (b) α < 0.73 when k = 2. [400 nodes PlanetLab tested]
some pair of consecutive groups have been compromised is:
p = P
[⋃
i
{|Gi∩B| ≥
√
N}
]
≤
√
N
∑
i=1
P
[
|Gi∩B| ≥
√
N
]
≤
√
N exp
(
−
√
N (1−2β )2
)
,
which also converges to zero as N grows to inﬁnity if β < 12 .
We can conclude that the probability of a compromise incurs
a phase transition when half of the nodes in the system are dis-
honest. The asymptotic number of dishonest nodes that DPol
can tolerate is therefore N/2.
We now evaluate the probability of the system being compro-
mised by simulation. We ﬁrst assume that dishonest nodes are
randomly distributed among the groups. For example, groups
could be built consecutively, i.e., the ﬁrst group is built by pick-
ing
√
N nodes uniformly at random, the second is built by pick-
ing uniformly at random
√
N nodes from the remaining nodes,
and so forth. Under this assumption, the probability of vio-
lating the condition of consecutive groups being compromised
can easily be computed. In Figure 7(a), we plot this probability
as a function of B in a 10,000-node network. It can be seen
that for B < 2,900 the probability is less than 1%. Therefore,
if the deterministic bound is relaxed by using a probabilistic
bound instead, the number of dishonest nodes that the system
can tolerate is consistently higher. In Figure 7(b), we plot the
maximum number of dishonest nodes that the system can toler-
ate, that is the maximum number of dishonest nodes tolerated
to keep the probability of violating the above condition below
1%).
5.5. Detecting dishonest nodes with private veriﬁcations
We now evaluate the probability of detecting a dishon-
est node cheating within the bounds derived in Section 4.2
when honest nodes agree to disclose private information with
a nonzero probability.
Theorem 10. There is nonzero probability of detecting a dis-
honest node which misbehaves, even if its impact on each can-
didate score is less than 3k+2.
Proof. Consider as a ﬁrst step the binary case (as shown in Sec-
tion 4.2.2, the results obtained in the binary case can be easily
extended to for d > 2). Assume that each node is willing to
disclose each of the ballots it sent or received with probability
pd > 0. Now suppose a dishonest node sends k′ > k+1 ballots
of the same kind, say k′ ballots (0,1). This node is detected
by a private veriﬁcation if at least k+ 2 of its proxies who re-
ceived a ballot (0,1) disclose it. Therefore, the probability for
the dishonest node to be detected is:
k′
∑
j=k+2
(
k′
j
)
p jd(1− pd)k
′− j .
Similarly, consider a dishonest node that receives n+b ballots
(1,0) and turns n of them into ballots (0,1). The dishonest
node is detected by a private veriﬁcation if at least n+b − n+ 1
of its clients disclose the ballots they sent to it. Therefore, the
probability for the dishonest node to be detected is:
n+b
∑
j=n+b −n+1
(
n+b
j
)
p jd(1− pd)n
+
b − j .
6. Related Work
We now discuss related distributed voting protocols with par-
ticular attention on those that do not depend on intractability
of mathematical computations. Like most non-cryptographic
voting protocols, DPol ensures privacy via secret sharing tech-
niques. DPol distinguishes itself from related work in the sense
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Figure 7: Average tolerance to dishonest nodes.
that no participant has a special role, following the peer-to-peer
paradigm, which results in increased scalability and robustness.
A large amount of work on secret sharing schemes (intro-
duced by Rivest et al. in [31]) has been published in the late
80’s. Benaloh [2] proposed a scheme for privately sharing se-
crets based on polynomials. Since this scheme is homomorphic
with respect to addition, it may be used for polling. However,
a dishonest participant can easily corrupt the initial shares in
the protocol, thus potentially impacting the ﬁnal outcome to a
signiﬁcant degree.
Assuming a majority of honest participants, Rabin and Ben-
Or extended Benaloh’s secret sharing and proposed veriﬁable
secret sharing scheme (VSS) [24]. Based on VSS, they pro-
posed a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol to pri-
vately compute the sum of the participants’ inputs with an ex-
ponentially small error on the output. Beyond the fact that these
techniques assume a fully connected network, synchronous
links and broadcast channels, they involve higher mathematics.
Moreover, since there is no control over the input itself (in con-
trast to DPol where the ballots are in {0,1} for each candidate
and therefore the vote is at most ±(2k+ 1)), a dishonest par-
ticipant may still share an arbitrarily high value and thus affect
the outcome in a potentially unbounded way. Series of follow-
up work on MPC have improved various aspects of the scheme,
but only recently begun thinking about making it scalable and
usable in practice [6, 5]. The appeal of this class of protocols
lies in strong privacy guarantees to participants, including the
dishonest ones, but also makes such schemes less suitable for
polling applications. Note that the same issues also apply to
complex secret sharing scheme and private multiparty compu-
tation such as AMPC [21].
In [20], Malkhi et al. proposed an e-voting protocol based on
AMPC and enhanced check vectors. While powerful, partici-
pants of this protocol have distinct and predeﬁned roles (deal-
ers, talliers, and receivers). This may result in decreased scala-
bility as the load of distributing initial ballots to voters falls on
a small set of nodes that are not part of the system (i.e., deal-
ers) and robustness if speciﬁc nodes fail. Nonetheless, these
design choices are fully justiﬁed by the requirements inherent
in e-voting applications, such as democracy, veriﬁability, and
unconditional accuracy. Instead, polling applications can re-
lax such constraints for the sake of simplicity. Another related
distributed voting protocol is the one proposed by Baudron et
al. [1] but it uses asymmetric cryptography.
At a high level, DPol also relates to distributed ranking
schemes. The principle of ranking is similar to polling, in that
a participant evaluates the quality of one of her peers by (i)
locally grading its behavior (input value), and (ii) collecting
the local grades assigned by the rest of the system. However,
to the best of our knowledge, most published work [15, 28]
has focused on designing accurate grading mechanism rather
than providing efﬁcient polling schemes. Dutta et al. [10] con-
sider grading free riders and take into account potential collu-
sion. Nevertheless, none of the proposed ranking schemes pro-
vide a global polling mechanism, as grading generally relies on
polling only a subset of nodes (peers usually collaborate with a
small part of the network). In addition, privacy is generally not
addressed in these schemes.
7. Conclusion
We considered the distributed polling problem in a social net-
work where participants are concerned about their reputation.
To address it, we presented DPol, a simple fully decentralized
polling protocol and proved that it can ensure privacy and accu-
racy, despite the presence of dishonest participants, by means of
veriﬁcation procedures. Our contribution is therefore twofold.
First, we deﬁne a new model of faulty nodes in distributed sys-
tems which incorporates the human and social nature of partici-
pants through privacy and reputation concerns. Second, we pro-
vide a combination of secret sharing and veriﬁcation techniques
to ensure privacy and accuracy under this model. We ﬁnd our
model of adversaries to be compelling for various non-critical
(i.e., not sensitive to small deviations on their outcome) private
and secure distributed computation problems in social settings
and that DPol thus paves the way for a new area of research in
distributed computing. In this spirit, a natural extension of our
protocol is to support arbitrary aggregation functions and revisit
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traditional problems of distributed computing. For instance, can
distributed consensus be reached under this model?
Turning our model and DPol into a solution that can be
adopted in practice will require some effort. First, our model
of adversaries in social networks asserts that honest participants
will always report misbehaviors, and that dishonest participants
do not blame honest participants because this may eventually
be detected, thus tarnishing the reputation of the dishonest par-
ticipants. To make these assumptions more realistic in practice,
the challenge is to design an automated tool to help users of
a social network evaluate and quantify the reputation of a par-
ticipant by cross-checking information such as tags and social
connectivity. Given the selectivity and speciﬁcity of such a tool,
it would be interesting, within the framework of game theory, to
study equilibria and optimal strategies for non-cooperating par-
ticipants who attach different values to their privacy, their repu-
tation, the outcome of the poll and the accuracy of the tally. Sec-
ond, DPol relies on a number of assumptions to provide privacy
and accuracy guarantees, including the uniform assignment of
nodes to groups, synchronization between different phases of
the protocol, a limited rate of churn, and that the number of
nodes is a perfect square. We intend to address each of these
assumptions to make DPol a practical peer-to-peer protocol.
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